Debunking A New Phoney: "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win War"—See Page 3.

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"Just A Ripple" That Might Engulf The World

When first heard it was comforting, there in Room 313-A of the Old House Office Building, the hearing room of the House Armed Services Committee, with its high arched ceilings and ante-bellum chandeliers, its massed flags and red draperies. The Secretary of Defense looked so wholesomely chubby and venerably white-haired that it sounded reassuring. The first question put to him by the long-winded chairman, Vinson of Georgia, was how the Administration reconciled the risks it was taking in the Formosa straits with the new budget's reductions in the armed forces. It was then that Mr. Wilson, with his gift for *gaffe*, said the Formosan crisis was "just a little ripple." It gave one a shiver afterward to think how this remark will look in the history books should this little ripple turn out to be a tidal wave.

Rationally considered, in the often deceptive search for a logical pattern in events, the Formosan crisis cannot be taken at face value. Surely this must be an international pantomime, with both sides making fierce faces at each other, in the expectation that alarmed third parties will separate them and impose a compromise settlement. Certainly Formosa is not worth a world war to either side, when war is likely to unleash a nuclear holocaust. The budget is a big business man's budget, a sound-dollar budget, worked out months ago, and behind Mr. Wilson's cheery remark about the "ripple" is no doubt the usual assurance from the military that this is a little fuss which can be settled if necessary with a few swift air force sorties and no need, positively, for any ground troops—just like Korea was originally supposed to be. "Anyway, they'll never call our bluff"—one can almost hear the words, though top secret and highly classified—"the Russians will never let 'em."

A Strange Kind of Monster

One of the most touching traits of the Russophobes in this capital is their childlike faith that while the Kremlin is inhabited by monsters, they are monsters who can be depended on to do nothing rash, and that with one telephone call to Peiping they can make the Chinese behave, too. This situation contains too many imponderables for trust in such magically monolithic restraint. Stalin himself was unable to hold back Mao, and there is no one in the Kremlin now with Stalin's prestige. That "paper tiger" talk and their military victories in Korea may have gone to the heads of some Chinese Communists. The new men in Moscow are not as sure of their power as was Stalin; with the prospect of German rearmament, there are signs of a shift back to hard policies; Molotov may not be bluffing. If war is to come, some Russians might prefer to see our war machine bog down in China, no small bog.

The issue is a poor one. We are drugged by our own propaganda. Nobody but us is going to equate Chiang Kai-shek with the cause of the "free world." Our bitter enemies, the Chinese on the mainland, and our uneasy allies, the Chinese on Formosa, agree on one thing, and that is China's title to Formosa; Chiang is as ready as Mao to fight "trusteeship." But this is not a situation to be met by legalistic argument. The threat of overwhelming force might settle the question and establish some temporary stability *if we really drew a firm and clear line.* The danger lies in that very vagueness for which Truman and Acheson were criticized by the Republicans in the case of Korea. It is too much to ask any Chinese regime to give up offshore islands like Quemoy and Matsu from which its mainland cities and shipping may be shelled. It is very hazardous, with trigger-happy aviators on both sides, not to make clear just where we say "so far and no further." To leave this vague is to invite incidents from which no graceful retreat may be possible.

"MacArthurism" Is Back in Favor

Too little attention has been paid to the vagueness of the Formosa resolution and the authoritative interpretation given it during the debate—if that word can be applied to it—in the House last Tuesday. Among the few questions asked was one by Mr. Yates of Illinois. He wanted to know whether the phrase about "such other measures" would authorize the President "to invade the mainland of China." The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee replied that it would authorize the President "to take physical possession of the islands in friendly hands"—we may find ourselves then garrisoning Quemoy and Matsu? Mr. Richards also said that while it would not authorize the President "to take possession of the ground on the mainland" it would authorize him "to attack the mainland if he deemed it necessary in support of the defenses of Formosa." Mr. Vorys of Ohio, a ranking Republican member of that committee, made the meaning clearer when he explained a few minutes earlier why no line had been drawn in the resolution. "It would certainly be disastrous," Mr. Vorys said, "if we, by law, created a privileged sanctuary on the mainland of China, as we did beyond the Yalu, if the Reds decided to defy our resolution to defend the Pescadores and Formosa." So this is an open door a la MacArthur to unlimited war on the mainland.

In the light of these all too obvious perspectives, and all the talk of recent months on the sheer impossibility of nuclear war, it was appalling to see how the House of Representatives rose to its responsibilities. All the slogans about freedom and slavery invariably to be encountered on both sides in every war, filled the fatuous air. The House was as ready to go to

(Continued on Page Four)

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Weak-Kneed Liberals and the Plague of the Secret Informer

The ACLU and the CIO Suggest A Compromise With the FBI

The issue of the secret informer is again before the Supreme Court. Can people be branded disloyal without a chance to cross-examine their accusers? Three years ago the Supreme Court split 4-4 on the question in the Dorothy Bailey case (341 US 918). Such tie votes leave the lower court decision standing. In that case, the Circuit Court in a 2-to-1 decision by Judge Prettyman (182 F. 2d 46) had upheld the use of secret informers.

Now the Supreme Court has agreed to hear argument on the same point in the appeal of Dr. John P. Peters, senior professor of medicine at Yale, a Public Health Service consultant dropped as a security risk. The circumstances are exactly the same as in Dorothy Bailey's case: all the evidence on the record was in his favor; the only adverse information was undisclosed and unsworn; even the hearing board was not allowed to question the secret informers and evaluate their testimony for itself; the accusations remained faceless.

The Right to Reputation

Dr. Peters is represented by former Judge Thurman Arnold's law firm, with two members of the Yale Law School faculty, Fowler Harper and Vern Countryman on the brief. They argue that the government may discharge for any reason it pleases so long as there is no "adverse finding" against the employe, but that it may not term a man disloyal or a security risk without a real hearing "with full opportunity to 'test, explain and refute'."

But three organizations — the American Civil Liberties Union, the CIO and the *Engineers and Scientists*—have filed briefs *amicus curiae* in the Peters case, and they foreshadow a different line of argument. The first explicitly and the latter in footnotes suggest a compromise which might appeal to a timid court. They suggest a distinction between the information supplied by professional undercover informants of the FBI and "casual busybodies." The former might still be protected by secrecy.

Casual Informers and Professionals

Such a distinction is made to order for the FBI. The ACLU's position is given added importance because the name of Morris L. Ernst is on its brief. It says (p. 26) that in non-sensitive and non-policy making positions "there is neither necessity nor justification for withholding one iota of confidential information, or for refusing the employe the right to cross-examine each and every adverse witness."

The brief goes on to argue, however, that "In 'sensitive' jobs, which involve either access to classified material or other information important to national defense and foreign relations, or in 'policy-making' positions in these areas, the professional or 'under-cover' informant should be separated 'from neighbors, maiden aunts and casual busy-bodies who have no legitimate reason for secrecy'."

A similar idea appears on page 5 of the CIO brief, which also bears the name of Joseph L. Rauh, a leading figure in *Americans for Democratic Action*, and Washington counsel for the United Automobile Workers. "If only a few persons in highly sensitive positions were being subjected to the ravages of secret informants," the brief says, "one might conclude that the balance of national interest lay with the President's judgment that the security of the nation required the protection of these secret informants." A footnote adds, "Of course, even here, the distinction might well be drawn between different categories of secret informants. An undercover agent of the FBI, for example, might be protected under many circumstances when the landlord, the school associate or village gossip ought not be protected."

A suggestion along the same line is made in a footnote on page 9 of the brief for the *Engineers and Scientists*. "In our collective professional experience," the footnote declares, "we have yet to see a loyalty or security case in which an FBI agent working internally in the Communist party was indicated as the informer rather than a neighbor, working associate, college classmate or the like. Like any other citizen, such a casual informer should not be protected because he does not want to testify. Rather, should his statements be disregarded as unreliable for that reason."

What The Moss Case Showed

The fallacious character of any such distinction is pointed up by the Annie Lee Moss case. There the accuser was no "casual informant" but "an FBI agent working internally in the Communist party," a Mrs. Markward. When Mrs. Markward was produced publicly as a witness against Mrs. Moss in the McCarthy hearings, it turned out (1) that she could not identify Mrs. Moss, (2) that there were at least three Annie Lee Mosses in Washington and (3) that Mrs. Markward had confused Rob Hall, the Washington correspondent of the *Daily Worker*, a white Southerner, with a Negro of the same name. Had Mrs. Markward remained a secret informant, immune from cross-examination, Mrs. Moss would never have been cleared.

Obviously, being a professional undercover agent for the FBI, does not necessarily make one any more reliable. On the contrary there are instances in which the professional informer, to keep his job with the FBI, tends to "remember" more and more as the years go on.

Many examples could be cited of cases in which professional informers of the FBI were found to have given information which failed to stand up in open hearing. A striking recent case was that of Ralph Bunche. Both witnesses against him were professionals. The extent to which the FBI and the Immigration Service depend on perjurious informers in radical cases has become notorious. There is no more reason to protect a Crouch or Matusow than the "casual" informer. The fundamental right to confront one's accuser, and force him to undergo cross-examination, was established in revulsion against just such secret police practices.

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This Is Volume III, No. 1, The Beginning Of Our Third Year

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Some Beguiling New Nonsense Made to Order for the China Lobby

How Atomic War Can Be Made Short and Sweet and Practically Painless

The Strategic Air Command is the sacred cow of the U.S. Air Force, but some younger officers are beginning to question dependence on "massive retaliation." They would like some way to retain the use of atomic weapons and yet seize, or seem to seize, the initiative for peace. They are afraid of the paralyzing effect that fear of all-out nuclear war may have on national policy.

They are anxious lest it create stalemate and peaceful coexistence. One of them, Colonel Richard S. Leghorn, on active duty until 1953 in the Office of Development Planning in the Air Force, now an executive of Eastman Kodak, has set forth new proposals in an article published by *U.S. News and World Report* in its issue of January 28. A similar article by another Air Force Colonel now in private industry is scheduled to appear in the February issue of *Air Force*, organ of the Air Force Association.

Leghorn's thesis, "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win War" is spread all over the *U.S. News* cover in bold black and red. This beguiling new theme song fits the needs of Chiang Kai-shek and the interventionists in dealing with an American public opinion numbed by an awareness of how vulnerable our own cities are. The Leghorn thesis bypasses the notion of an atomic stalemate with the seductive prospect of small, limited wars in which nobody *much* would get hurt. "Massive retaliation" would no longer threaten enemy cities or our own. Big bombers and aircraft carriers are termed outmoded. Total war theories are dismissed as "100 percent foolish" in the nuclear age. "But war is expected to last only a few weeks."

Like Painless Dentistry

Atomic war, like dentistry, is to become practically painless. "For civil defense within the U.S. the plan," says the editor of *U.S. News*, "calls for shutting down all major cities when war begins, moving populations out and small caretaker forces in, for the few weeks of war's 'decisive phase'." Just as Paris empties in August for the vacation season, so would our cities empty for these brief interludes of war, while the people scatter (on vacation pay?) to the woods and mountains for a rest.

The new painless warfare can be adapted to large wars or small. "Tactical use of nuclear weapons against solely military targets is the basis of his plan. Enemy industry would not be threatened. Neither would enemy population centers, unless U.S. cities were hit first." In this way, with little disturbance beyond a possible short trip to the country, "the author insists, both Korea and Indo-China could have been won by the West and Formosa"—happy thought!—"could be held now."

Small Boy Minds at Work

German militarists and Fascists over the past few generations made their country seem a land led by Wagnerian pyromaniacs. Articles like Leghorn's may make America seem a land led by Boy Scouts, clean-cut, naive, sincere, and well-meaning, but terribly dangerous because politically ignorant, appallingly self-righteous and waving weapons which could destroy the world.

Leghorn's blueprint for world order would fit nicely into "The Rover Boys in the Nuclear Age" or "Tom Swift and the H-Bomb." To begin with, we do not give up nuclear weapons —what small boy would voluntarily relinquish such wonderful fire-crackers? In the second place, he naturally assumes that, using these magic weapons, we will police the world. Leghorn would have the President issue a proclamation abandoning massive retaliation for "Nuclear Punishment." This would have four points: if an aggressor attacks with surface forces using conventional weapons, we will destroy his units in the battle zone and the immediate rear areas with tactical nuclear weapons; if he uses aircraft as well, we will wage "hot pursuit" with nuclear weapons and destroy his air bases; if he uses nuclear weapons, we will utilize "our nuclear plenty to destroy instantly and utterly" the nuclear stockpiles and the entire delivery capability of the aggressor; should he make nuclear attack on U.S. cities or those of our allies we will then destroy his. Leghorn explains that the purpose of this system is to "make the punishment fit the crime," an unconscious echo of Gilbert & Sullivan in his script.

And If The Enemy Does The Same?

What if the other side uses tactical nuclear weapons against our battle zone? What if the Chinese answered "hot pursuit" by nuclear attack on our bases in Japan or Okinawa? What if the enemy tried to destroy our nuclear stockpiles and the air bases of our Strategic Air Command? Leghorn assumes that we could use nuclear tactical retaliation without nuclear tactical counter-attack. Such assumptions, neatly tying up the plot for a happy ending, are better suited to movie melodrama than to serious military strategy.

Colonel Leghorn lives in a comfortably simple universe. What does he do about "internal subversion"? Special elite troops are to be dropped by parachute "and police the country temporarily pending prompt UN-supervised elections." And if the elections go against us, as we are afraid the elections in Indo-China will? The thought never seems to enter the Colonel's head.

Nor does it ever occur to him that nuclear weapons might be ineffective against dispersed guerrilla troops in a country like Indo-China or Malaya, that we would be using a sledge-hammer for a fly-swatter.

The biggest fallacy lies at the heart of Leghorn's proposal. He sees a U.S. "unilateral" declaration not to bomb cities as a means of gaining the propaganda initiative yet keeping nuclear weapons for "tactical" use.

But can cities be spared from atomic destruction so long as atomic weapons are used? Leghorn himself is forced to hedge his answer. He starts by saying that it would be wisest to strike first at nuclear stockpiles and nuclear air bases, not at cities, since the former represent the real danger. But what if these are situated in or near cities? In that case, Leghorn would use "precision bombing" and thus "limit major destruction to about one-half mile of the target circumference." There can be a lot of innocent bystanders in a half-mile circle of city.

When Is A City Not A City?

Leghorn extricates himself from the dilemma by re-defining what he means by a city. "For purposes of the proposed policy," he finally writes, "we should define a city as any population concentration not within the destruction radius of the size weapon required to destroy a military nuclear installation." He adds reassuringly, "There are no other military targets in cities which we need to bomb."

This is not the only hedge. The "Punishment for Peace" policy also envisages saturation bombing within a 200 mile zone along any invading frontier so as utterly to blast the communications and supply of an aggressor. And what if there are border cities in this zone? These urban areas, too, would be an exception to the pledge. The two exceptions to his no-bombing pledge, in the thickly populated and highly urbanized countries of Western Europe and Eastern Asia, would be enough to incinerate millions of human beings, and poison the atmosphere for millions more.

Yet Colonel Leghorn's thinking, puerile as it may be, represents the more thoughtful younger elements of the Air Force. The High Command is content with SAC and massive retaliation, though as Colonel Leghorn says "in nuclear war, names on casualty lists will be replaced by estimates in mega-deaths." Everything seems to be "mega" nowadays except our brains.

If You Have Not Yet Renewed, Please Do So Now

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The House Voted for War on The Basis of Facts Kept From It

(Continued from Page One)

war with the H-bomb as cave-men were a few milleniums ago with a club. The same mindless enthusiasm, the same fake gravity, the same cowardice on the part of the few thoughtful, which can be matched on the eve of every war, were here in evidence. Mr. Colmer of Mississippi said that we had no quarrel with the people of China, but we are nonetheless prepared to destroy them with the latest technical devices. Mr. Winstead from that same State, a well-known citadel of liberty, said "Christianity, Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights are seriously threatened." Mr. Zablocki of Wisconsin averred that "We cannot cower and hesitate." Mr. Rivers of South Carolina said he was voting to let the President use nuclear weapons "and I hope he will start at Peking and work right down." Mr. Rivers waxed lyrical. "We can roam the skies of China and Russia at will," he gloated. ". . . And old Curtis Le May [head of the Strategic Air Command], just untie his hands and he will level them." Thus we prepared to enforce the finer civilized and Christian virtues.

Rubber Stamp Democracy

Mrs. Church of Illinois thought it "refreshing and wholesome" that the President had asked for authorization "in truly democratic process." A few minutes later she was telling the House that she had voted for the resolution in committee only after five hours of executive session testimony by Dulles and Radford. "The main tragedy being," she added, "that we cannot tell you all of the facts in the case, ever." A House which votes a blank check for war 409-3 on the basis of facts which cannot be disclosed to its own members *"ever"* was engaged in something less than pure "democratic process." (And is it safe to let Dulles and Radford dish out "facts" without fear of rebuttal?)

Mr. Holifield of California alone had the nerve to make some really critical observations, though he did not dare vote against the resolution. Mr. Holifield pointed out that just two years ago, on February 2, 1953, Eisenhower sent the Congress a message in which he declared that under the Democrats the Seventh Fleet had been used "as a defensive arm of Communist China." Mr. Holifield forbore to add that forces which must be rescued by our fleet from the Tachens, obviously never were the menace to the mainland they boasted of being. The Generalissimo who was going to liberate China cannot even hold the offshore islands alone. Mr. Holifield did courageously point out what disastrous advice from Radford and Dulles was rejected by Congresional leaders after Dienbienphu last year, and asked "Are you giving the same two advisers a blank check today?" Can it be that with the election safely over neither party is as interested in peace?

Is It Wrong to Stop, Look and Listen?

Never were graver issues rushed through Congress with less thought. Mr. Smith of Virginia (the Mr. Smith of the Smith Act) opened by saying that the Formosan resolution represented "one of the most far-reaching steps in foreign policy that will be taken by Congress." Yet as Chairman of the Rules committee he introduced it under a rule strictly limiting debate to two hours, and forbidding any amendment. He hoped there would be no dissenting voice from his fellow Democrats and that they would show "where the national interest and security of our country is concerned, we are Americans." Apparently it is true devotion to one's country to rubber-stamp war resolutions without giving thought to the consequences. Can we be sure the Chinese are bluffing? Can we be certain this war can be waged without using ground troops? Do we want to risk a long war on the mainland in which the best of our youth might be bled in endless fighting? Should we use nuclear weapons? Would they automatically open the door to victory? And how will all Asia and Africa react if once again colored peoples are chosen for our experiments in wholesale incineration in nuclear warfare? Is it unpatriotic, is it being untrue to this great and blessed country of ours to suggest that we stop and consider such questions before taking the plunge?

As we go to press, early on the morning of January 27, there are signs that the Senate, unlike the easily steam-rollered House, will hear some real debate. At least Langer and Morse voted against the war resolution in joint committee; six other Senators joined them in voting for amendments by Kefauver and Humphrey designed to limit our military commitments. Long questioned the haste and Flanders termed this "preventive war." Now is the time for all good men to speak up.

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